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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Cody Fortin (hereinafter Mr. Fortin and/or Appellant) appeals from 
convictions following a jury trial for the offenses of aggravated battery and use of a 
deadly weapon in the commission of a crime. 
Course of Proceedings 
After having been charged via complaint and amended complaint with 
aggravated battery and use of a deadly weapon in commission of a crime, Mr. Fortin 
waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court on those 
charges and a criminal information was filed. (R. p. 8-9, 13-14, 21, 22-23.) 
The matter proceeded to jury trial where Mr. Fortin was found guilty as charged. 
(R. p. 69.) Mr. Fortin was sentenced to 25 years with the first 12 years fixed. (R. p. 
80.) Mr. Fortin timely appeals. (R. p. 83.) 
Statement of the Facts 
This case was the subject of a jury trial. As explained by the victim, Darryl 
Shaylor, he was at a house party where people were drinking and using marijuana. (Tr. 
5/17/2010, p. 2.) Mr. Shaylor testified that he only had one beer and was not using 
drugs.1 (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 5.) 
This was a common theme of the state's witnesses, to wit, that there was alcohol, 
marijuana and according to one witness, methamphetamine, being used, but the 
particular witness testifying at the time insisted that he or she had not used the drugs 
and only had one drink. 
1 
Mr. Fortin and his friend Derrick came to the house and at some point, Mr. Fortin 
began arguing with one of the people there (Aaron Moore). (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 6, 8.) 
When Mr. Fortin challenged the other people there as well, Darryl Shaylor told him "I'm 
not the person to be messing with tonight. I am in a bad mood." (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 9, Ins. 
14-15.) According to Mr. Shaylor, about 5 or 10 minutes later Mr. Fortin came at him 
across the living room and so he stood up and Mr. Fortin swung at Mr. Shaylor (who 
said he usually waits for the first swing) and the fight happened from there. (Tr. 
5/17/2010, p. 10.) 
Mr. Shaylor testified that they went to the ground and were rolling around, and 
Mr. Fortin was trying to shove his fingers in his eyes and bite him and choke him. (Tr. 
5/17/2010, p. 11.) Mr. Shaylor was able to take control and got on top and hit him and 
then hit him three more times in the forehead and it stopped things for a little bit and he 
was able to go out to the front of the house because he was feeling dizzy and had been 
losing blood. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 12.) He laid down outside and first he did not know he 
had been stabbed, he thought the blood was Mr. Fortin's but then realized it was his 
own (he had a stab injury to his neck/shoulder). (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 12-13.) 
Mr. Fortin then came outside and came up to Mr. Shaylor who saw a flash of 
something shiny by his pocket, and while he couldn't really see it, he assumed it was a 
knife. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 14, 18.) Mr. Shaylor said that Mr. Fortin hesitated but then his 
friend stepped up an encouraged him. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 16.) Mr. Shaylor asked him 
"What are you going to do with that?" (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 18.) Mr. Fortin swung the knife 
and cut Mr. Shaylor across the face and then took off running. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 18.) 
Mr. Shaylor yelled at him "Are you kidding me?" (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 19.) He felt a rush 
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again and laid down to try to cool down and looked around but Mr. Fortin was already 
gone. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 19.) Mr. Shaylor denied bringing or using a weapon that night. 
(Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 20.) 
The state called many witnesses who were at the party, but none of them saw 
Mr. Shaylor get stabbed in the house. Kasey Smith, a close friend of Mr. Shaylor's, was 
at the party (where she only had one beer). (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 51.) She testified she 
saw the slashing motion toward Mr. Shaylor while they were outside, although she did 
not put that in her statement to the police. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 59, 73, 74.) She never 
saw a knife but saw something shiny outside. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 83.) She also said that 
Mr. Fortin tried to get in Candice's car. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 60.) 
Aaron Moore, who actually admitted to drinking 1 0 or 12 beers and a couple of 
shots of rum, did not see any of the fight because he was in the kitchen when it started 
and he ran away because he was a felon on probation. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 10, 16.) 
James Bungard (who claimed he wasn't drinking or using drugs at all) testified 
that after the fight in the house, Mr. Fortin picked a knife up off the floor and folded it up 
and pretended to put it in his pocket. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 31, 43.) He said Mr. Fortin took 
the knife and went outside, and he peeked out the door and saw him quickly slash 
across Mr. Shaylor's face. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 44-45.) Interestingly, he denied that 
anyone was using marijuana (which almost all the other witnesses admitted), but 
testified that Kasey, Candice and John were smoking methamphetamine (which all the 
other witnesses denied) and that he had told the police that. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 52-53.) 
He also admitted that he didn't put anything in his statement to police about the 
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slashing, and had lied in the statement when he had said he saw Mr. Fortin brandishing 
a knife outside. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 60-61.) 
John Vida, whose residence this occurred at (and who claimed he had like one or 
two beers but no drugs), didn't see the whole fight (or any knife). (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 67, 
70, 77.) At the first part of it he was in his backyard trying to keep his dog out of it and 
after the people went outside the house he saw nothing because he shut the door and 
locked it. Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 73, 79.) 
Dawn Cliff, who had just started dating Mr. Shaylor (and claimed she wasn't 
drinking that night), saw Mr. Fortin outside holding what she believed to be a knife, 
because she saw a silver point, but she didn't see the full knife, and she didn't see what 
then happened between them. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 109-110, 112.) 
Mr. Fortin did not testify at trial, however, he advised the PSI writer that while he 
engaged in a physical fight with the victim, he didn't stab him and never had a knife. 
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THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF MR. FORTIN'S FLIGHT 
A. Standard of review. 
The Idaho Supreme Court explained the standard of review for this issue in State 
v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,965 P.2d 174 (1998): 
Admission of evidence which is probative on the issue of flight to avoid 
prosecution requires the trial judge to conduct a two-part analysis. First, 
the judge must determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401, 
and second, the judge must determine that the probative value of the 
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
This Court reviews the question of relevancy in the admission of evidence 
de novo. A court's decision that evidence is more probative than 
prejudicial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Id., p. 819 (internal citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225 (2008), detailed 
the abuse of discretion standard: 
When determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we 
consider: 
(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; 
(2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; 
and 
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Id., p. 228. 
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B. The arguments and rulings on flight. 
The state filed a Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence, which provided 
as follows in full (R. p. 30.): 
COMES NOW, Christopher Atwood, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
for the County of Ada, and notifies the Court and Counsel of the 
State's intent to use facts as described below as evidence during 
the jury trial in this case. The State does not believe that the 
evidence falls under Idaho Criminal Rule 404(b) but out of caution 
the State provides this notice in the event the Court finds otherwise. 
If the Court finds the evidence is 404(b) evidence then the State 
believes the evidence of the defendant's crimes, wrongs, or acts is 
admissible to prove the defendant's identity. 
The state intends to introduce evidence of the Defendant's conduct 
when he was approached by law enforcement officers the day after 
the aggravated battery occurred. When the officers approached the 
Defendant and informed him he was under arrest, the Defendant 
fled from the officers indicating consciousness of guilt from the 
aggravated battery he had committed one day earlier. This 
evidence was disclosed to Defendant in the police reports in the 
State's Discovery Response in CRFE2009-0019475. 
Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence, p. 1-2. (R. p. 30-31.) 
The defense objected to the I.R.E. 404(b) (hereinafter 404(b)) evidence and the 
matter was taken up at trial outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel had 
attempted to obtain a pre-trial ruling, but the court would not take it up earlier. (Tr. 
5/ 1 8/201 0, p. 214, 21 7.) 
The offer of proof by the prosecutor was that the day following the stabbing, a 
number of law enforcement officers approached the defendant to arrest him while he 
was in his vehicle. A number of officers tried to use their cars to surround the defendant 
while he was in his car. They had their lights on and approached the car with guns 
drawn and police badges visible. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 208.) 
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When the officers approached, the defendant fled from them in his car. They 
pursued him approximately 8-10 miles when he crashed his car and ran on foot into a 
field and then into a wooded area and into a ditch. The officers had called for backup 
and a number of officers pursued him and surrounded the ditch and called for him to 
come out with his hands up. Eventually they called in a K-9 who went in and bit the 
defendant. The defendant eventually did come out and was arrested. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 
208-209.) 
The prosecutor stated he did not intend to introduce the fact that the defendant 
struck a police officer during his flight because that is the subject of a different charged 
case, aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer. Further, the prosecutor stated 
that he didn't intend to introduce all of the evidence of the eluding because that is 
largely the other case as well, and so he did not intend to get into how fast he was going 
and whether or not he put other people at risk and the fact that he side-swiped another 
vehicle. But the prosecutor stated that he does intend to introduce the distance of the 
flight and that he continued his flight on foot. The prosecutor explained that he filed the 
404(b) notice out of an abundance of caution, he does not believe it is 404(b) evidence, 
but rather, is evidence of flight. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 209-210.) 
In response, defense counsel confirmed that there are two criminal cases 
pending against the defendant in this jurisdiction, the instant aggravated battery and the 
other one charging eluding. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 210.) The state did not consolidate the 
cases. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 216.) 
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Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's recitation of what happened was 
not complete. The officers were actually plain clothes officers and were driving 
undercover (as opposed to simply unmarked) cars, to wit, a PT Cruiser. 2 
Thus, according to defense counsel, where undercover officers approach in plain 
clothes and unmarked cars, it is not even evidence of flight to avoid prosecution. (Tr. 
5/18/2010, p. 215.) Defense counsel explained that Mr. Fortin's position was that the 
alleged victim had actually brought the knife to the fight the night before, and now 
someone was approaching him with a gun. (Id.) 
The court clarified that the state does not believe that the evidence falls under 
404(b) because it is not evidence of prior bad acts, but is evidence of flight from this 
act. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 212.) The court's ruling was as follows: 
The law for years has been that flight can be argued-a flight to avoid 
arrest can be argued by the prosecutor as indicia of guilt. At one time, in 
fact, there was a pattern jury instruction where the jury was instructed that 
if an accused defendant fled, that the jury could construe the fact that a 
defendant was fleeing to avoid arrest to be an indication of guilt. 
Modern instruction practice says you don't instruct juries that way 
anymore, but I think that the law in Idaho clearly is that counsel are 
entitled to argue the facts. The rational basis of that is that the 
circumstances, a defendant's conduct, a defendants' demonstrated 
conduct from the time of the event giving rise to the criminal charge to at 
least a reasonable time thereafter is relevant for examination to see not 
just what did the defendant do at the time of the crime, but what did he do 
after the crime was-after the alleged crime was committed. How did he 
2 Actually, the detective testified at trial they were driving a Nissan Altima, a Honda 
Accord, and a GMC SUV of some kind. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 57, 60.) Also, while their 
lights were on as the prosecutor stated, they were not traditional light bars, for instance, 
one car had wig wag lights (the headlights alternatively flashing) and also had rapid 
motion LED lights on the passenger side visor, and another car had the rapid motion 
LED lights on its grill. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 42-43.) As to their dress and identification, the 
detective testified that he was wearing civilian clothing (T-shirt) with his badge hanging 
around his neck and another officer was wearing a black windbreaker with a flip down 
police insignia which was not flipped down. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 47, 62-63.) 
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comport himself? Where did he go? What did he do? How did he respond 
when approached by officers? That is all within the -the old-fashioned 
word is "res gestae." I don't know what the modern term is but there is a 
more modern term for that. But that is all in the gambit of relevant 
circumstances and it is fair game for both sides to investigate and 
examine. 
It is equally appropriate, for example, if a defendant's conduct is 
completely the other way from any indication of guilt, that the defense may 
bring forward that it shows that his comportment and activities and 
conduct after the allegation are totally inconsistent with the prosecutor's 
allegation of the occurrence of a crime. So it cuts both ways. What did the 
defendant do? How did he act? How did he respond? What was his 
conduct at least to the extent that you have a reasonable time after, and I 
think here we are talking about one day and think that is certainly within 
reach. 
I indicated that I didn't think it was a 404(b) problem because I think 
404(b) discusses prior bad acts or unrelated bad acts. And if you are 
examining a defendant's conduct after a circumstance with relation to the 
circumstance itself it is not a 404(b), it is an extension of the defendant's 
conduct in connection with the circumstance. 
Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 220, In. 24-p. 222, In. 22 (emphasis added). 
A colloquy then occurred about the evidence of the police dog which went in and 
bit Mr. Fortin, after which the court continued: 
I am not sure where that goes. My struggle on this is an extraneous issue 
that we are going to explore at some length that doesn't have anything to 
do with any of the elements of the crime. And once you get the dog 
involved in this thing, I think fear of the dog-that doesn't have any 
necessary connection to flight to avoid arrest. 
[PROSECUTOR] No, it is just how the officers found him. 
THE COURT: But that is not relevant. The fact that they -I can understand 
the argument that he in his flight is evidence. The officers' response is 
not necessarily indicative of anything. 
His flight, okay. Officers gave chase. Well, because A follows B, I'll say 
okay, they gave chase because that leads to the chase on foot. But I don't 
think you need to add-you don't need to embellish the chase with the 
fact that it was 990 miles-an-hour though downtown Boise, you have 
already indicated that you are not going there, anyway. 
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Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 225, Ins. 2-24 (emphasis added). 
stated: 
A colloquy then occurred about the details of the chase, after which the court 
... I will let you put in evidence of flight but without emphasizing the police 
officers' response to that other than the fact that they did pursue, they did 
pursue him, they did add officers as needed until they finally had enough 
officers and had him surrounded and accomplished the arrest. Will that 
satisfy that State? 
[PROSECUTOR] It will. 
THE COURT: With that caveat I will allow the testimony, and with the 
representation that you are not going to go into the high speed, the crash, 
and the crashing into the police car, and crashing into the civilian car. 
[PROSECUTOR]: That is fine. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I think I should put out for the record I do 
just want to renew my objection to any of this evidence coming in. 
THE COURT: I didn't think you were very happy about this. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I just wanted to make sure there is a record. 
Tr. 5/18/2011, p. 228, In. 16-p. 229, In. 14. 
C. The court erred by admitting the evidence of flight. 
First of all, the district court erred by not understanding that the evidence of flight 
is other bad acts evidence. Then, since it did not understand the type of evidence at 
issue, it failed to use the proper two step test to determine the evidence's admissibility. 
The court at one point stated that the flight evidence did not fall under I.R. 
404(b) (hereinafter 404(b)) because was not prior bad acts evidence, and later, stated 
there was no 404(b) problem because it did not concern prior or unrelated bad acts. 
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The district court was wrong, flight is other bad acts evidence. As explained by 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818 (Ct.App. 2009): 
Escape or flight is one of the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting 
evidence of prior bad acts or crimes. State v. Gootz, 110 Idaho 807, 814, 
718 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Ct. App. 1986). Evidence of escape or flight may be 
admissible because it may indicate a consciousness of guilt. Id. However, 
the inference of guilt may be weakened when a defendant harbors 
motives for escape other than guilt of the charged offense. Id. 
Admission of evidence which is probative on the issue of flight to avoid 
prosecution requires the trial court to conduct a two-part analysis. State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998). First, the trial court 
must determine that the evidence is relevant under I.RE. 401; and, 
second, the court must determine that the probative value of the evidence 
is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. This 
Court reviews the question of relevancy in the admission of evidence de 
nova. Id. A trial court's decision that evidence is more probative than 
prejudicial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
Id. p. 821-822. 
In other words, even though there is an established exception by which flight 
evidence may be admissible, it is still other bad acts evidence. Thus, the proper other 
bad acts test must be used. 3 
So in our case, the district court was required to perform a two step analysis. 
First, the court had to find that evidence of flight was relevant. It then needed to 
determine that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. 
In addition to the law specific to evidence of flight which requires the two step 
analysis, such as Rossignol, supra, as well as State v. Moore, supra, since the 
evidence that the state desired to introduce was also an uncharged crime, the district 
3 Incidentally, while 404(b) evidence is commonly referred to as prior bad acts evidence, 
there is no requirement that it be prior (and flight of course would not be), the rule 
simply refers to "other crimes, wrongs or acts." 
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court should have also known to perform the two step test under 404(b) itself. Here, 
the other bad acts evidence constituted the crime of eluding police, which was not 
charged in this case, but in a separate case. 
This situation is similar to that in State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225 (2008), where 
the Idaho Supreme Court had to determine whether the defendant's admission that he 
had earlier dealt methamphetamine fell under 404(b ). 
The initial question is whether Sheldon's statements were admissions of a 
past crime, wrong, or act. Since methamphetamine dealing is prohibited 
under I.C. § 37-2732B(a) (also I.C. § 37-2732(a)), his admission would be 
categorized as 404(b) evidence. Thus, the trial court was required to make 
a two-tiered analysis to determine whether the evidence was inadmissible 
propensity evidence under 404(b) or whether the evidence could be 
admitted for some other purpose. First, the court considers whether the 
evidence is relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime 
charged. Second, the court considers whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant. This Court exercises free review over the first inquiry -
relevance - but reviews the second inquiry - risk of unfair prejudice - under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Unfortunately, the district court appears 
not to have recognized the statements as 404(b) evidence and, thus, 
failed to perform the two-tiered analysis. 
Id., p. 229 (emphasis added, internal citations and footnote omitted). 
Our case is the same, since eluding police is a crime it would be categorized as 
404(b) evidence and the two-tiered analysis required. 
So in our case, whether analyzed under the established law regarding flight 
evidence or the more general law regarding other bad acts, the district court was clearly 
required to perform the two step analysis prior to its admission. As to the first step, 
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relevance, although it made some contrary comments, it does appear that the court did 
rule that the flight evidence was relevant.4 
However, the court clearly never made any ruling about probative value or 
prejudice, presumably because it did not believe that the flight evidence was other bad 
acts evidence for which that second step was required. However characterized, this 
failure by the court was error. At the very least, the court abused its discretion since it 
admitted evidence without reference to the legal standards regarding such evidence. 
In State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961 (Idaho 2010), the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained: 
Idaho shall from this point forward employ the Chapman harmless error 
test to all objected-to error. A defendant appealing from an objected-to, 
non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to establish that such 
an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of 
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id., 974. 
In this case, the defense objected below and has established on appeal that an 
error occurred. Accordingly, unless the State meets its burden, the convictions must be 
reversed. 5 
4 The court mentioned at one point that the flight issue has nothing to do with any of the 
elements of the charged crime. It also holds that the use of the dog is not relevant, 
however, the court never reconciles just why if the dog is not relevant, anything else 
about the chase would be. 
Also, it is interesting to note that the State's notice of intent to use 404(b) evidence said 
that the evidence of flight was relevant to show identity, which was never mentioned by 
the court as a reason the evidence was relevant. 
5 This is true for every issue on appeal, each having been objected to at trial. 
14 
11. 
THE COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING A DEFENSE WITNESS 
A. Standard of review. 
A lower court's determination under I.RE. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Birk/a, 126 Idaho 498 (Ct.App. 
1994). 
B. The background and court's rulings. 
After the state rested, defense counsel stated that he had spoken with a witness, 
Candice Waters, during the break and she said that she overheard Darryl Shaylor (the 
victim) discussing his testimony with another witness (Kasey Smith) and that Candice 
knew specific questions that counsel had asked Darryl Shaylor. 6 (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 101-
104.) 
Apparently, both Kasey Smith and Darryl Shaylor had already testified when they 
had their discussion. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 105.) Candice Waters had been listed as a 
witness by the state, but had not been called. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 102-103.) Defense 
counsel indicated that he might call her. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 102.) 
As to the relevance of her testimony, defense counsel explained that a primary 
issue of the defense was that Darryl Shaylor and other witnesses had all been talking 
about their stories and their stories had changed. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 110-111.) 
Despite the fact that the witnesses were violating the court's order to not discuss 
the case, the court stated there was no proof that any testimony was tainted since the 
6 Earlier in the trial there had been another instance where Darryl Shaylor had been 
discussing the case with another witness. Dawn Cliff overheard them and testified 
about it. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 5-12, 105-107.) 
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two witnesses discussing their testimony had already testified and while Candice may 
have overheard, she was not going to be called as a witness. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 107.) 
Thus, the court ruled that it was not going to allow the defense to call Candice Waters 
to testify about overhearing Darryl Shaylor discussing his testimony with another 
witness. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p.108, 116-117.) 
Further, the court would not allow the defense to call Candice Waters as an 
eyewitness to the crime. As defense counsel explained, she was an eyewitness who 
filled out a police statement form. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 114.) Defense counsel made an 
offer of proof, and related that during the break, she told him that she did not see Mr. 
Fortin throw a punch, it may have happened, but she didn't see it. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 
114-115.) The court asked whether she was in a position to observe, and defense 
counsel said he didn't know, that is what this trial is for. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115.) 
Defense counsel also explained that she would also testify that Mr. Fortin came to her 
car accidentally, and she had to tell him it was her car, not his. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115.) 
The court ruled that there was nothing relevant that was not cumulative of what 
the State had already presented and there is nothing exculpatory because counsel was 
not saying that she would testify that it did not happen, the most she can say is she 
didn't see it happen and that's already been the testimony of a handful of witnesses. 
(Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115.) Counsel responded that those witnesses had changed their 
stories from their written statements to now saying they did see something outside, to 
which the court responded that was not accurate. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115-116.) 
Counsel clarified that the court was ruling that he could not call Candice Waters 
and the court said he could not unless he could show something that was not 
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cumulative or was exculpatory. Defense counsel stated that she did not see Mr. Fortin 
throw a punch or make a slapping motion outside. Second, she had testimony 
regarding the credibility of the witnesses, having been present en two occasions where 
Darryl Shaylor was discussing the case with other witnesses (the other one which Dawn 
Cliff testified about). (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 116.) 
The court ruled as follows: 
Which I would not permit you to go into [Shaylor talking to other 
witnesses], in-in that aspect, because it doesn't impact-if-from that 
testimony only, because that's already been inquired into, unless she 
was a witness. 
And unless you can represent that she was a -that she saw it, --that it 
didn't happen, not that she didn't see it happen, because that's not 
necessarily exculpative, unless you can prove-unless you can establish 
that she was in a position to see, and was looking, and it didn't happen, 
didn't-by--by saying she didn't see it happen that it didn't happen. 
If she wasn't looking, and what I'm understanding you to say is she didn't 
see it happen, but it could have happened, which kind of says to me she 
was not in a position to observe, which is not exculpatory. 
I would otherwise rule that-on-on the State's case, it's--that--that 
anything else she adds is cumulative to what the State's already added. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The only thing-the only information I can give the 
Court, as an offer of proof of what Candice Waters is going to say, is her 
statement and the--what she just told me in the hall. So other than that , I 
. request that we be allowed to call her as witness. 
THE COURT: On the--offer of proof, I would find that the evidence--the 
constructive evidence of what she did observe is cumulative to what the 
State has already offered and not exculpatory. And Counsel has not 
offered anything in the offer of proof that is exculpative. And therefore, the 
test-the testimony would be cumulative to the State's offer and 
otherwise irrelevant. 
Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 116, In. 25-p. 118, In. 6. 
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Not being allowed to call the witness, the defense rested without calling any 
witnesses. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 119.) 
C. The court erred by excluding the defense witness. 
While the district court did not cite any authority for its ruling excluding the 
witness, presumably it was pursuant to I.R.E. 403, which provides as follows: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
I.R.E. Rule 403 (emphasis added). 
While the court claimed that Candice Water's testimony was inadmissible 
because it was cumulative to what the State had already presented, just because other 
witnesses had testified to the subject matter does not make it needlessly cumulative 
and therefore inadmissible. 
As explained in State v. 8/ackstead, 126 Idaho 22 (Ct.App. 1994): 
Statements by witnesses which corroborate the facts to which another has 
already testified are not necessarily inadmissible because they are 
"cumulative." Rule of Evidence 403 prohibits the introduction of needlessly 
cumulative evidence. There is no merit in the argument that this evidence 
was needless. The entire tenor of Blackstead's defense was that the victim 
had recently fabricated the allegations against him for the purpose of 
staying at the treatment facility or being placed with her stepmother rather 
than returning to her natural mother. Such an implication of recent 
fabrication gives importance to evidence corroborating the victim's 
testimony that she had mentioned the defendant's misconduct to someone 
within days of the occurrence. 
Id. p. 22. 
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Like in the case above, in our case, the proposed testimony was corrobative, not 
cumulative, or if it was, it was not needlessly so. The evidence regarding Mr. Fortin 
cutting Mr. Shaylor's face while outside was extremely inconsistent. Only one witness 
(John Bungard) actually testified that he had saw both the knife and the slashing, but he 
also admitted he lied in his police statement about Mr. Fortin brandishing the knife 
outside and that he didn't mention the slashing in his statement to police.7 
Kasey Smith, Mr. Shaylor's very close friend, testified she saw the slashing 
motion toward Mr. Shaylor while they were outside, although she did not put that in her 
statement to the police, and she never saw a knife but saw something shiny outside. 
Dawn Cliff, who had just started dating Mr. Shaylor, saw what she believed to be 
a knife, because she saw a silver point, but she didn't see the full knife, and she didn't 
see what then happened between them. 
While two other witnesses did not see what happened outside, it was because 
they were not outside when it happened. Aaron Moore had run away and John Vida had 
shut the door and locked it. 
Given this testimony, the testimony of Candice Waters, to wit, that she did not 
see Mr. Fortin punch or slash Mr. Shaylor while they were outside, is not cumulative. 
While her testimony may have been the same as what all the other witnesses (who 
were outside at the time) told the police, for two of the three witnesses, their stories 
changed by the time of trial and they had now seen the slashing motion. Therefore, 
instead of being needlessly cumulative because it was the same as the other witnesses, 
7 Significantly, his testimony about the drug use in the house was completely different 
from everyone else's, he denied anyone was using marijuana but stated that other 
witnesses were using methamphetamine. 
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the testimony of Candice Waters actually corroborated the defense theory of recent 
fabrication and impeached the two witnesses who did change their story. In short, 
where the state's witnesses are changing their story, the defense should be allowed to 
put on the witness who didn't. 
Also, by the time of trial, only Dawn Cliff testified that she did not see the 
slashing motion so Candice Water's similar testimony should have been considered to 
be corroborative of that, not needlessly cumulative. The district court was simply 
wrong when it stated that a handful of witnesses had already testified this way. 
Further, this was evidence favorable to the defense and was the only witness the 
defense would be calling. The court was incorrect in requiring defense counsel to 
establish prior to testifying that the witness had the opportunity to observe since as he 
stated, that is what the trial is for. More to the point, that was the prosecutor's job, if she 
didn't have the opportunity to observe then her testimony would be impeached, not 
disallowed in its entirety. 
Finally, Candice Waters also had evidence that no one else did, to wit, that Mr. 
Fortin accidentally went to her car and she had to tell him to go to his. While Kasey 
Smith testified that he went to Candice's car, she did not include the part that it was by 
accident, and so the jury could have been left with the impression that Mr. Fortin was 
trying to attack Candice as well, and her testimony would clarify that he was not. 
To summarize, a witness who says she did not see a disputed event happen is 
providing exculpatory evidence, and her ability to see is a matter for cross examination. 
Further, her evidence was not needlessly cumulative; it corroborated the other witness 
who did not see the slash and also impeached the witnesses who only recently said 
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they saw it. Finally, Candice Waters had the clarifying testimony about the car that no 
one else did. 
While the district court's rush to conclude what it obviously considered to be a 
slow trial may well be understandable, it should not have come at the expense of 
excluding the one and only defense witness. For all the reasons above, the district 
court erred by excluding the witness. 
111. 
THE COURT ERRED DENYING THE MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
A. Standard of review. 
The standard of review was explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. 
Field, 144 Idaho 559 (2007): 
When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error 
supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural 
or evidentiary error we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for 
reversible error. 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the 
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether 
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented 
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, 
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the 
"abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the 
continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the 
mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be 
disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted 
reversible error. 
Id. p. 571 (internal citations omitted). 
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B. The motion and the court's ruling. 
On cross examination, defense counsel was asking Mr. Shaylor whether he ever 
got a clear look at the knife because he haq just said it was a shiny object. The following 
exchange took place: 
A. Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and 





So it's just your opinion that this was a knife? 
I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind. 
How do you know it was a knife? 
Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the face, 
and I know most gang members carry those. 
Tr. 5/17/2011, p. 30, Ins. 15-24 (emphasis added). 
Defense counsel started to object and the court ruled that volunteered answer 
about the gang member be redacted and the jury to disregard it. However, the court 
stated that was all it would do since it was an open ended question, but that it would 
take up counsel's motion at the break. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 31.) 
At the break, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that his question in 
no way, shape or form invited a response regarding gang members. Defense counsel 
argued that given the current prejudice against gangs, it is one of the most prejudicial 
things that could have been said, and it is too inflammatory to be cured by a curative 
instruction. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 41-44.) 
The prosecutor stated that he had not intended to bring up the fact that he was a 
gang member. 
And I've advised them, and I'm pretty sure I advised the victim the same 
thing, Mr. Shaylor, that it is not to be mentioned unless you're asked a 
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question that calls for it, and that you cannot lie if asked a question. You 
must tell the truth, but not to volunteer that information unless it's asked of 
you. 
Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 45 Ins. 13-18. 
The court again ruled that defense counsel invited the error because he asked 
"how do you know," which allowed him to say everything that was going on in his mind, 
which included that gang members carry knives. If defense counsel wanted to avoid a 
particular answer, he should have asked precise questions or brought a motion in 
limine. Thus, while the court struck the answer and instructed the jury to disregard it, 
the court ruled that it is not a mistrial issue and denied the motion for mistrial. (Tr. 
5/17/2010, p. 47-48.) 
C. The court erred by denying the motion for mistrial. 
Appellant disagrees with the court that the question invited the answer. The 
witness was simply taking advantage of the open ended question to inject prejudicial 
information to the jury, rather than it being some valid answer based on stream of 
consciousness thinking as apparently held by the court. 
We know this because of the prosecutor's comments, which the court ignores. 
The prosecutor's admonishment was that gang information was not to be mentioned 
unless a question calls for it and it was not to be volunteered. In other words, even if in 
the victim's mind a reason he knew it was a knife was because gang members carry 
knives, he had been admonished to not mention gangs unless a question called for it, 
and it cannot seriously be argued that the question called for that answer even if he was 
thinking it. Even the court referred to it as a volunteered answer, showing that the 
question did not call for that answer. 
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Therefore, this is not a matter of a two word blurt out answer which was not 
mistrial material as held by the court. Rather, it was a victim in a case intentionally 
prejudicing the defendant by providing inflammatory information despite the fact that he 
had been told not to. 
As further evidence that this was not just some inadvertent mistake, it must be 
remembered that this same witness also violated the court's order to not discuss his 
testimony with other witnesses on two different occasions. While defense counsel may 
have not been able to establish that this affected other testimony, it nevertheless shows 
that this witness was intentionally violating admonishments, and in this instance at least, 
did so in an obvious attempt to unfairly prejudice the defendant. This is mistrial material, 
and the court erred in denying it. 
IV. 
THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL 
Appellant asserts that the errors discussed above combine to constitute 
cumulative error. In State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct.App. 2007), the 
Court of Appeals explained: 
Having identified multiple errors, we would normally address whether, 
pursuant to I.C.R. 52, each of these errors was harmless. However the 
cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there is 
an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself may be harmless, 
but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of 
the defendant's constitutional right to due process. In order to find 
cumulative error, this Court must conclude there is merit to more than one 
of the alleged errors and then conclude that these errors, when 
aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. 
Id., 171 P.3d at 1289 (footnote and internal citations omitted). 
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The multiple errors in this trial have all been discussed at length above. 
Therefore, they will not be unnecessarily repeated in this section, but Appellant will 
simply request that his convictions be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial 
because of the cumulative error. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Fortin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for 
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aggravated battery with deadly ~eapon enhancement. ,/,:;/ 
DATED this ?rf' day of November, 2011. ~) 
/ 
~;re;1'§. Sily/y 
/A)}brney J0'r Appellant 
C / 
/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ?rel day of November, 2011, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by the method as indicated 
below: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATEHOUSE, ROOM 210 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
25 
() U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
~ Hand Deliver~d to t~p Att~mey 
General's ma1lbox,,at th / 
/• 
Supreme Cou')t1 
/(" 
/' 
Gregsfey" /
1 
V 
